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VALIDITY AND APPLICATION OF THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT AFTER CITY OF
BOERNE V. FLORES
INTRODUCTION
During this survey period, September 2000 to August 2001, the
Tenth Circuit grappled to define a standard for evaluating alleged viola-
tions of the First Amendment's protection of the free exercise of religion.
The Tenth Circuit exhibited little difficulty in concluding that the Su-
preme Court's 1997 landmark case, City of Boerne v. Flores' invalidated
the highly controversial Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA" or
the "Act")2 only as it applied to state actions. In this regard, the court
aligned itself with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits in holding that claims
alleging federal government violations of the Free Exercise Clause
should be held to the highest constitutional standard when brought under
RFRA.
The Tenth Circuit was less certain, however, of exactly how to ap-
ply the RFRA standard. On August 8, 2001, three different Tenth Circuit
panels released opinions involving challenges to the same federal regu-
lation but arriving at very different conclusions. Cognizant of the incon-
sistencies among the results in these cases, the court vacated all three
decisions and ordered an en banc re-hearing to bring about consistency
within the circuit. The en banc hearing was held on January 15, 2002.
The regulation at issue in all three cases was an exception to two
federal laws that prohibit the possession and transportation of eagles and
eagle parts, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act7 ("BGEPA") and
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act8 ("MBTA"). The exception allows mem-
bers of federally recognized Indian tribes to possess eagle feathers for
Indian religious purposes after obtaining a permit from the U.S. Fish and
1. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
2. 42 U.S.C §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (2001).
3. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001).
4. Saenz v. Dep't of the Interior, No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698 (10th Cir.
Aug. 18, 2001), vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam);
United States v. Hardman, No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. 17702 LEXIS (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001),
vacated by Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199; United States v. Wilgus, No. 00-4015, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
17700 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001) vacated by Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199.
5. United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
6. See generally Saenz v. Dep't of the Interior, No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698
(10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2001), vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam); United States v. Hardman, No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702 (10th Cir. Aug. 8,
2001), vacated by Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199; United States v. Wilgus, No. 00-4015, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17700 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001) vacated by Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199.
7. 16 U.S.C. § 668(2001).
8. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2001).
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Wildlife Service.9 In each of these cases, the federal government had
seized eagle feathers from individuals, who did not qualify for permits
because they were not enrolled in federally recognized tribes.'° All three
individuals claimed eagle feathers were necessary for their religious
practices and challenged the permitting regulation as unconstitutionally
burdening their First Amendment free exercise rights." In one case, the
court invalidated the regulation.'2 In the other two cases, the court upheld
it.1
Several factors contributed to the mixed results. One factor, which
is the central focus of this article, was whether courts must apply
RFRA's strict scrutiny standard to all free exercise claims or whether
they should apply the less rigorous Employment Division v. Smith 4 stan-
dard, if none of the parties invoke RFRA.
These cases also raised important questions concerning the govern-
ment's unique relationship with federally recognized Indian tribes,'" spe-
cifically, whether case law involving Indian trust and treaty rights man-
dates application of rational basis review to laws and regulations de-
signed to benefit tribes and tribal members.'6 Some members of the court
9. See 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2002).
10. See Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *2-3; Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
17702, at *2-3; Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *24.
11. See Saenz, No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698 at *34; Hardman, No. 99-4210,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702 at *2-3; Wilgus, No. 00-4015, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS at *24.
12. See Saenz, No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *38.
13. See Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *71; Wilgus,, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS, at
*34.
14. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
15. On rehearing, several tribes submitted amiCus curiae briefs. Brief of Amici Curiae Ute
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th
Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4210); Brief of Amici Curiae Hopi Tribe, United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d
1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4210); Brief of Amici Curiae Jicarilla Apache Nation, United States
v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4210); Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Legal
Society, United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4210).
16. Indeed, a compelling argument can be made that these cases should be decided in the
context of Indian law, which is a "distinct field, with its own doctrines and traditions," independent
of broader legal, social and political concerns. See FELIx S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 220-28 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) (describing the development of the
Federal Indian Trust Doctrine and its application as a limit on Congressional authority over Indians).
Cf John Celichowski, A Rough and Narrow Path: Preserving Native American Religious Liberty in
the Smith Era, 25 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 1 (2001) (surveying Indian First Amendment/Free Exercise
claims before and after Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); Antonia M. De Meo,
Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: Environmental Protection v. Native American Free Exercise of
Religion, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 771, 808 (1995) (asserting Indian religious claims should be
analyzed under the Federal Indian Trust Doctrine because the Free Exercise Clause and the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act "fail to offer Native Americans effective religious
protection"); Matthew Perkins, The Federal Indian Trust Doctrine and the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act: Could Application of the Doctrine Alter the Outcome in U.S. v. Hugs?, 30 ENVTL. L.
701, 701 (2000) (arguing "a valid trust doctrine argument remains to be made for Native American
religious freedom" against federal limitations on Indian use of eagle feathers and parts for religious
purposes). See generally David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of
[Vol. 79:3
VALIDITY AND APPLICATION OF RFRA
questioned whether the government had a compelling interest in con-
serving eagles and called for more fact finding on the issue. 7 Although
each of these issues merits in-depth discussion and analysis, they are
discussed here only to the extent that they influenced or were implicated
in the various panels' decisions on first hearing.
Part I of this article traces the jurisprudential history of what at least
one commentator has dubbed the "holy war" that has been raging since
the early 1960s over the appropriate standard for evaluating free exercise
claims.'" At the center of the debate is RFRA, which has drawn fire for
both its substantive content and the manner of its birth. 9 At stake is the
delicate balance between the First Amendment's protection of the indi-
vidual's religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause and its protec-
tion of the national interest in maintaining separation of church and state
under the Establishment Clause.1 Also at issue is the scope of Congress's
legislative powers when they collide with the judiciary's long-established
authority to interpret the Constitution.2' By placing RFRA in the context
of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that preceded and followed the statute's
enactment, it becomes apparent why some have vilified RFRA as an
"unconstitutional grab for power" by Congress,22 while others remain
States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 340-61 (2001)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's use of Indian cases as a "crucible" to further a broader agenda under
which state interests prevail, rights of racial minorities fail and mainstream values are protected,
while undermining the "political relationship between the United States and self-governing tribes").
17. See Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *71
18. Robert Hoff, Losing Our Religion: The Constitutionality of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 377, 377
(1998).
19. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994). In an early critique of
RFRA, Eisgruber and Lawrence argue the Act is substantively unconstitutional because it
"privileges" rather than "protects" religious practices and impermissibly favors religion over equally
important secular concerns. Id. at 447-61. They claim RFRA's "constitutional vices" are directly
associated with the Act's "origin as an attempt by Congress to undo the Supreme Court's
constitutional judgment." Id. at 444. They also expressed concern that Congress had exceeded its
powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, foreshadowing a similar conclusion the
Supreme Court would reach later in City of Boerne. Id. at 460-69; see City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507,
516-36 (1997) ("Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the
federal balance.").
20. Compare Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional,
Period, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 2-8 (1998) (arguing RFRA violates the Establishment Clause), with
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is a Constitutional Expansion of
Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601, 632-34 (1998) (arguing the protection RFRA affords free
exercise is not incompatible with the Establishment Clause).
21. See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 604, 606 (arguing that the Constitution sets the
"floor" for protected personal liberties which Congress may expand under its section 5 powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment). For the opposing view, see Hamilton, supra note 20 (arguing RFRA
violates Article V); Edward J.W. Blatnik, No RFRAF Allowed: The Status of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act's Federal Application in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores. 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1410 (1998) (arguing RFRA violates Article V).
22. Hamilton, supra note 20, at 5.
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steadfast in their belief that RFRA was a legitimate expansion of rights"
that correctly imposed "the highest standard of constitutional protection
from one of the most important freedoms guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion., ,
Part II describes four Tenth Circuit decisions rendered during the
survey period which involved religious freedom claims, the first of
which established the continued viability of RFRA as applied to federal
government actions and the three other cases that illustrate the differing
perspectives within the court as to the constitutionality of the eagle
feather permitting regulation. Finally, Part III summarizes the questions
the Tenth Circuit identified for discussion in its order for rehearing en
banc.
I. BACKGROUND
A. In the Beginning, There Was Sherbert v. Verner 5 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder 6
The Brennan Court's 1963 decision in Sherbert was the first shot in
the war of constitutional standards, because it "marked the first time that
the Supreme Court applied the compelling interest test to a Free Exercise
Clause challenge to a generally applicable law. 23 In Sherbert, a Seventh-
day Adventist claimed South Carolina violated her First Amendment
right to free exercise of her religion by denying her request for unem-
ployment benefits. 28 The woman's employer had fired her for refusing to
work on Saturday, which was the Sabbath Day of her faith.29 Because the
claimant would not accept Saturday work, she was unable to find another
job and filed an unemployment benefits claim. 30 The state denied her
request for benefits based on a statutory provision that disqualified any
claimant who "failed, without good cause.., to accept available suitable
work."3 The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the state's decision,
reasoning that the statutory disqualification placed no restriction upon
the claimant's religious freedom nor did it "prevent her in the exercise of
23. See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 629-34.
24. Hoff, supra note 18, at 380.
25. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
26. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
27. See Hoff, supra note 18, at 380. The Court has made the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment applicable to states by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 86-87
(1990)).
28. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-401.
29. Id. at 399.
30. Id. at 399-400.
31. Id. at 401 (quoting S.C. Code § 68-114(3)(a)(ii)).
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her right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with
the dictates of her conscience."32
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the state court's deci-
sion and ruled for the claimant.3 The Court held that to withstand the
claimant's constitutional challenge, South Carolina's decision to deny
unemployment benefits:
must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents
no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exer-
cise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of [her]
religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest' in the regu-
lation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate.34
Though the Court found the consequences of denying the claimant un-
employment benefits to religious practices and principles "only an indi-
rect result" of legislation that was "within the state's general competence
to enact," it held that where the "purpose or effect of a law" impedes a
religion or discriminates between religions, such a law "is constitution-
ally invalid., 35 Here, the government forced the plaintiff to choose be-
tween "following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits...
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work," which the Court held was "the same kind of burden upon the free
exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against [her] for her Satur-
day worship. 36
The Court then found South Carolina failed to show "some compel-
ling state interest" that would justify the "substantial infringement" of the
plaintiffs First Amendment right." In so doing, the Supreme Court also
noted "no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable
state interest would suffice," and "only the gravest abuses, endangering a
paramount [state] interest" would permit a limitation on an individual's
free exercise of religion.
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Wisconsin v. Yoder,39 which
further clarified the "compelling interest" standard by stating a "regula-
tion neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly bur-
dens the free exercise of religion."0 The issue in Yoder was whether the
32. Id. at 401 (citing Sherbert v. Vemer, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746 (S.C. 1962) overruled by
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (internal quotations omitted)).
33. Id. at 402.
34. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
35. Id. at 403-04 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
36. Id. at404.
37. Id. at 406.
38. Id. (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
39. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
40. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
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State of Wisconsin, under its compulsory school-attendance statute,
could impose criminal penalties on Amish parents who refused to send
their children to school past the eighth grade.4' The Court said no, not-
withstanding Wisconsin's argument that the requirement for school at-
tendance to age 16 applied "uniformly to all citizens of the State and
[did] not, on its face, discriminate against religions or a particular relig-
ion" and was "motivated by legitimate secular concerns. '"42
B. Court Redraws the Borders in Employment Division v. Smith 
3
Almost three decades after Sherbert, the fortress of compelling in-
terest surrounding free exercise came tumbling down in 1990 with the
Court's decision in Smith. The question in Smith was whether the Free
Exercise Clause permitted the State of Oregon to deny unemployment
benefits to Native Americans who were dismissed from their jobs for
using peyote during religious ceremonies." The Court said yes.45
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia went to great lengths to dis-
tinguish the circumstances in Smith from Sherbert and its progeny.46
Here, the Court distinguished between religious beliefs and "perform-
ance of (or abstention from) physical acts," particularly acts that violate
criminal laws.47 The Court also attempted to distance Smith from previ-
ous decisions by noting it had applied the Sherbert balancing test to in-
validate generally applicable laws only when they involved the Free Ex-
ercise Clause "in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such
as freedom of speech and of the press."' Yoder, for example, was ration-
alized as presenting a "hybrid situation" in which "the interests of par-
enthood [were] combined with a free exercise claim." 9 The Supreme
41. See id at 207.
42. Id. at 220.
43. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment; Blackmun, J., with whom
Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., join, dissenting).
44. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
45. See id. at 890.
46. See Getches, supra note 16, at 341-42 (analyzing Smith as an example in which the Court
used an Indian case as a "crucible" for promoting states' rights in ruling "states should not be
burdened with proving a compelling interest to enforce its laws every time someone claims to have
violated the law in the name of religion"). Getches suggests the unusual facts of this case, which
were "unlikely to be replicated in mainstream religious cases," provided the Court with a "vehicle
for changing First Amendment law and giving governments more latitude to regulate religious
practices that are contrary to mainstream norms." Id. Thus, even if the Court is not pursuing a
specifically anti-Indian agenda, its application of traditional First Amendment principles rather than
established Indian law doctrine effectively erodes and diminishes Indian rights. See id at 342.
47. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78.
48. See id. at 881.
49. See id. at 882 n. 1. But see Hoff, supra note 18, at 382-386 (agreeing with the conclusion
Congress would reach in its finding that compelling interest was "a workable test for striking
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests"). Hoff
points to many of the same cases the Court cited in Smith as evidence of the Sherbert test's
effectiveness in rendering some laws invalid and others valid. Id. See also Smith, 494 U.S. at 902
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Court went on to attack Sherbert directly by arguing its applicability had
been limited to "denial of unemployment compensation" cases, offhand-
edly dismissing cases that evidenced the contrary as only "purport[ing] to
apply" the Sherbert test.50 The Court further narrowed applicability of
Sherbert even in the unemployment benefits context to those situations in
which "the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, [which]
it may not refuse to extend ... to cases of 'religious hardship' without
compelling reason."5'
In finally rejecting the compelling interest test, the Supreme Court
asserted that to do otherwise would "subvert its rigor in the other fields
where it is applied." 2 The Supreme Court also raised the specter of "an-
archy" under the compelling interest test's presumption of invalidity
extended to every regulation of conduct that may be challenged given the
broad diversity of religious beliefs that could be burdened. 3
The significance of the majority opinion was not lost on other mem-
bers of the Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor, who applied the Sherbert
compelling interest test to arrive at the same result as the majority, vig-
orously disagreed with Justice Scalia's analysis of precedent and the
majority's decision to reduce the standard of scrutiny. " The three dis-
senting justices concurred with Justice O'Connor's reasoning when she
wrote:
The Court today gives no convincing reason to depart from settled
First Amendment jurisprudence. There is nothing talismanic about
neutral laws of general applicability or general criminal prohibitions,
for laws neutral toward religion can coerce a person to violate his re-
ligious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effec-
tively as laws aimed at religion.5
Smith's effects in Free Exercise Clause cases "were immediately felt."56
A firestorm of controversy ensued, provoking vehement criticism by
"impassioned commentators" 57 and "high-profile hearings [on Capitol
Hill] on Smith's 'evisceration' of free exercise rights." '
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing post-Sherbert precedent has demonstrated "the courts have been
quite capable of applying our free exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing state interests").
50. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
51. See id. at 884.
52. Id. at 888.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 901.
55. Id.
56. See Hoff, supra note 18, at 388-91 (arguing the new standard of scrutiny "virtually
eliminated any protection previously provided by the Free Exercise Clause").
57. Id. at 378. See also Getches, supra note 16, at 341 n.323 (citing, e.g., John Delaney,
Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith,
25 IND. L. REV. 71, 72 (1991) (arguing that "minority religious claims will be held hostage to
majoritarian politics")); Roald Mykkeltvedt, Employment Div. v. Smith: Creating Anxiety by
20021
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C. Congress Enters the Fray with RFRA5 9
Congress's response to Smith was unambiguous. In passing the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Congress clearly set its sight
on the Supreme Court's decision in Smith as "virtually eliminat[ing] the
requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise
imposed by laws neutral toward religion .... I" because neutral laws
could burden religious exercise "as surely as laws intended to interfere
with religious exercise."6 ' Furthermore, Congress stated RFRA's purpose
was to:
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner.
. and Wisconsin v. Yoder... and to guarantee its application in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and to
provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is sub-
stantially burdened by government.
62
RFRA received almost unanimous Congressional support with all mem-
bers of the House of Representatives and all but three members of the
Senate voting for the Act.
63
Specifically, RFRA prohibits government from substantially bur-
dening the exercise of religion "even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability. . .. .64 The Act also allows individuals whose re-
ligious freedom has been burdened in violation of RFRA to "assert that
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain relief
against a government." 65 The government may substantially burden free
exercise only when the government demonstrates that such a burden
furthers "a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 6 RFRA is
retroactive and far-reaching in scope, applying to all federal and state
statutory and judge-made law.67 In addition, RFRA expansively defines
Relieving Tension, 58 TENN. L. REV. 603, 631 (1991) (concluding "the degree to which various sects
will be free to exercise their religions will be determined by their political power and not by the
application of legal principles by a disinterested judiciary").
58. Blatnik, supra note 21, at 1411 (citing Kent Greenawalt, Why Now Is Not the Time for
Constitutional Amendment: The Limited Reach of City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 689, 689 (1998)).
59. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2001).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
61. Id. at § 2000bb(a)(2).
62. Id. at § 2000bb(b).
63. Hoff, supra note 18, at 392 n.97.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb- l(a).
65. Id. at § 2000bb-l(c).
66. Id. at § 2000bb-l(b).
67. See id. at § 2000bb-3(a) (stating "[tihis Act applies to all Federal and State law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the
enactment of this Act enacted Nov. 16, 1993"). This language was in the 1993 Act, but reference to
"and State law" has been deleted by amendment. Id.
302 [Vol. 79:3
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"religious exercise" to encompass "any exercise of religion, whether or
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief' including
"[tihe use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of
1168religious exercise....
Subsequently, parties raised RFRA claims in contexts from AIDS
and abortion to zoning. 69 For example, courts applied RFRA to invalidate
a school district policy that prohibited students from bringing ceremonial
knives to school; 70 portions of the federal Bankruptcy Code that allowed
the government to recover funds that a debtor had tithed to a church;
71
and a grooming regulation that required Rastafarian correctional officers
to cut off their dreadlocks.7 ' RFRA claims, however, failed to invalidate
the Food and Drug Administration's refusal to mandate labeling of ge-
netically modified foods;73 a zoning regulation that limited locations in
which churches could operate food banks and homeless shelters ;74 and
drug possession and trafficking charges against a "Church of Marijuana"
member.75
D. The Court Strikes Back with City of Boerne
76
The Supreme Court's reaction to RFRA was "[as] decisive as Con-
gress's reaction to Smith ... In City of Boerne, Justice Kennedy led
the majority in striking down RFRA - at least as the Act applies to state
and local governments - holding the Act "intruded into an area reserved
by the Constitution to the States. '78 At issue was a local ordinance and
historic preservation plan under which the City of Boerne denied a
Catholic church's application for a permit to enlarge its building.79
An argument more prominent than one based on federalism came
from the majority's assertion that Congress had invaded the judiciary's
turf, thereby violating separation of powers principles.0 Indeed, the Su-
preme Court's opening round relied on the M'Culloch v. Maryland's
68. Id. at § 2000cc-5(7). See § 2000bb-2(4) of RFRA (providing the term '"exercise of
religion' means religious exercise, as defined in section 2000cc-5 of this title").
69. See generally Mary L. Topliff, Validity, Construction, and Application of Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 135 A.L.R. FED. 121 (1996) (listing almost 200 topics in which RFRA
protections have been sought).
70. See Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir. 1995).
71. See United States v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1420
(8th Cir. 1996).
72. See Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
73. See Alliance for Bio-integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 181 (D.D.C. 2000).
74. See Daytona. Rescue Mission v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554, 1561 (M.D.
Fla. 1995).
75. See United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1509 (D. Wyo. 1995).
76. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
77. Hoff, supra note 18, at 380.
78. City of Boeme, 521 U.S. at 527.
79. Id. at 511-12.
80. See id. at 516.
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pronouncement that the "Federal Government is one of enumerated pow-
ers,"" immediately followed by Marbury v. Madison's declaration that
the legislature's defined and limited powers may not be mistaken, or
forgotten.82 These premises form the basis for "judicial authority to de-
termine the constitutionality of laws[] in cases and controversies." 3
While acknowledging Congress's authority to enact legislation enforcing
the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion pursuant to section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court noted, "[a]s broad as
the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited."8
Here, the Court found Congress exceeded its limits by enacting leg-
islation that lacked "congruence between the means used and the ends..
" because RFRA's legislative record lacked evidence of "modern in-
stances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious
bigotry." 85 Furthermore, the Court considered RFRA "so out of propor-
tion to [the] supposed remedial or preventative objec[tivel ... that it...
appear[ed] instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional pro-
tections." 86 The Court specifically objected to RFRA's "[siweeping cov-
erage [that] ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing
laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and re-
gardless of subject matter. 87 In a rebuke of Congress, Justice Kennedy
asserted the judiciary's authority to define the parameters of constitu-
tional rights:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is best pre-
served when each part of the Government respects both the Constitu-
tion and the proper actions and determinations of the other branches.
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within
the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say
what the law is. When the political branches of the Government act
against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution
already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and contro-
versies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them
under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expec-
tations must be disappointed. RFRA was designed to control cases
and controversies, such as the one before us; but as the provisions of
the federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it
is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must control.8
Despite Justice Kennedy's clearly expressed hostility toward Con-
gress' s enactment of RFRA, the extent to which the Court invalidated the
81. Id. at 516 (citing M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819)).
82. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 176 (1803)).
83. Id.
84. City of Boeme, 521 U.S. at 518 (citing Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970)).
85. Id. at 530.
86. Id. at 532.
87. id.
88. Id. at 535-36.
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Act remains cloudy in that the opinion repeatedly refers to RFRA's im-
pact on state laws.s9 In one such instance, the Court also makes clear that
it reduces the standard of review two notches below "compelling inter-
est" to minimal scrutiny: "Even [assuming that a interpretation of RFRA
would] in effect.., mandate some lesser test, say, one equivalent to in-
termediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching
judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalida-
tion."9
E. Post-City of Boerne Fallout
RFRA opponents elevated the significance of City of Boerne's sepa-
ration of powers argument to posit the Supreme Court effectively invali-
dated RFRA in its entirety as applied to both state and federal law. 9'
Therefore, some courts and commentators viewed RFRA as dead.92 But
those who read City of Boerne more narrowly - like the Tenth Circuit93 -concluded that RFRA still applies to federal government actions.94
89. See, e.g., id. at 533-34 ("The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of
proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved."
Requiring a "state [to] demonstrate a compelling interest and show that [it has adopted] the least
restrictive means of [achieving that]" interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional
law. (emphasis added)).
90. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added).
91. See Hamilton, supra note 20, at I ("[Tihe message of Boerne is that RFRA is
unconstitutional under any scenario, whether it is applied to state or federal law."). Cf Blatnik, supra
note 21, at 1412-13 (asserting that the Court left "unanswered" RFRA's constitutionality in its
application to federal law, but arguing the Act is unconstitutional in its entirety for reasons other
than those set forth in City of Boerne).
92. See, e.g., Blatnik, supra note 21, at 1412 n. Il (citing cases in the Sixth Circuit, Seventh
Circuit, several district courts and bankruptcy courts which have rejected RFRA claims based on the
assumption that such claims are moot as a result of City ofBoerne); Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at
634 (implying RFRA's demise by suggesting Congress could "reenact the law" by showing that
neutral laws of general applicability do seriously burden religious freedom); Hoff, supra note 18, at
380 (stating the Court "struck down the statute" with no distinction between its applicability to state
versus federal law).
93. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 2001) (Holloway, J., concurring
and dissenting; Ebel, J., concurring) ("This court agrees ... with both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
in their conclusion that [City of Boeme] does not determine the constitutionality of RFRA as applied
to the federal government.") (citing Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 831-33
(9th Cir. 1999); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 858-59
(8th Cir. 1998)).
94. See also, Blatnik, supra note 21, at 1413 n.12 (citing cases in the Fifth Circuit, Sixth
Circuit and several district courts asserting City of Boerne did not reach the issue of federal laws).
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II. TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
A. Kikumura v. Hurley
95
1. Facts
Yu Kikumura was a federal prisoner, who had emigrated from Ja-
pan.96 Upon entering prison, he listed Buddhism as his religious affilia-
tion to support his request for a special diet.97 Kikumura later became
acquainted with a Methodist minister, who had served as a missionary in
Japan and was familiar with Kikumura's spiritual culture.98 Kikumura
accepted the minister's offer to make pastoral visits.99 However, prison
officials denied the minister's requests to visit Kikumura based on a
prison regulation that required (1) requests for pastoral visits be initiated
by the inmate; and (2) the member of the clergy be of the same faith as
that professed by the inmate.' °° Kikumura's administrative appeal was
denied.'0 ' Kikumura then filed a claim in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, asserting prison officials had violated his
religious beliefs under the First Amendment, as well as his right to equal
protection under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.02 In addition
to damages and permanent injunctive relief, Kikumura sought a prelimi-
nary injunction and a temporary restraining order to compel prison offi-
cials to grant the request. 3 The district court denied both the preliminary
injunction and the temporary restraining order."" Kikumura appealed.'0 5
Because denial of a temporary restraining order was not reviewable, only
the preliminary injunction was subject to appeal.' 6
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
In the Tenth Circuit, a preliminary injunction must be granted if the
movant demonstrates:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the case; (2) ir-
reparable injury to the movant if the preliminary injunction is denied;
(3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the
95. 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001).
96. Kikumura, 242 F.3cL at 953.
97. Id. at 954.
98. Id. at 961.
99. Id. at 953.
100. Id. at 954.
101. Id.
102. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 954.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 955.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 955 n.2.
[Vol. 79:3
VALIDITY AND APPLICATION OF RFRA
other party under the preliminary injunction; and (4) the injunction is
not adverse to the public interest.'07
However, when a preliminary injunction would disturb the status quo,
the movant must satisfy a heightened burden of showing that the four
factors "weigh heavily and compellingly in his favor."'0 ' In reviewing
Kikumura's request for a preliminary injunction, the court applied the
heightened burden requirement. '09
a. RFRA Claim
The court's major conclusion is its most controversial in light of the
national debate over RFRA's applicability to federal government actions
in the post-City of Boerne era. Specifically, this Tenth Circuit panel was
unanimous in finding the district court erred when it concluded the Su-
preme Court in City of Boerne had declared RFRA unconstitutional in its
entirety and, therefore, Kikumura's RFRA claim had no likelihood of
success."0 Rather, the Tenth Circuit, aligning itself with the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits,"' held City of Boeme invalidated RFRA only as it applied
to state, but not federal government action." 2 Therefore, the court ordered
the district court to allow Kikumura the opportunity to provide eviden-
tiary support for his RFRA claim on remand."3
In reaching its conclusion, the panel implicitly overruled an earlier
unpublished Tenth Circuit case, which was among those the defendants
had used to support their argument that City of Boerne had rendered
RFRA unconstitutional in its application to the federal government.1
4
The Tenth Circuit here asserted the "only issue" before the Supreme
Court in City of Boemne was "Congress's remedial powers to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment against state and local authorities."' ' 5 "Because
Congress's ability to make laws applicable to the federal government"
does not depend on its Fourteenth Amendment, section 5 enforcement
power, the court reasoned, "the [City of Boerne] decision does not de-
107. Id. at 955. See also Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1283 (10th
Cir. 1996).
108. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 955.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 958.
111. Compare Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 831-33 (9th Cir.
1999), and Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 858-59 (8th
Cir. 1998) (interpreting City of Boeme as invalidating RFRA only as applied to state actions), with
Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001), Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116
F. Supp. 2d 166, 180 (D.D.C. 2000), Combs v. Corrections Corp. of America, 977 F. Supp. 799, 801
(D.W.D. La. 1997), and In re Gates Cmty. Chapel of Rochester, Inc., 212 B.R. 220, 225-26 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1997) (interpreting City of Boerne as invalidating RFRA as applied to both state and
federal actions).
112. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 958.
113. Id. at 961.
114. Id. at 958.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
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termine the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the federal govern-
ment."' 6 The court concluded, "[tihus, the separation of powers concerns
expressed in City of Boerne do not render RFRA unconstitutional as ap-
plied to the federal government.'",
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court in City of
Boerne did "mention" separation of powers concerns."' However, it
found in the context of the entire [City of Boerne] opinion that the Su-
preme Court raised these concerns only to the extent that RFRA could
not be considered remedial or preventative under the limits the Four-
teenth Amendment imposes on Congress's enforcement power vis-a-vis
the states.' '9 By contrast, Congress's power to apply RFRA to the federal
government comes from Article I, which allows Congress to establish
standards for suits against the federal government that are more protec-
tive than the Constitution requires. 
2
0
After determining that the unconstitutional portions of RFRA that
applied to state government could be severed and did not alter RFRA's
structure or applicability to the federal government, the court found fed-
eral officials, such as the prison officials here, within the class of defen-
dants subject to RFRA requirements.
2'
The panel, however, lacked unanimity in the application of RFRA'.
At issue was the provision that "[g]overnment shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion . . ." without compelling justifica-
tion. '1 3 The majority held this requirement is a question of law for which
a plaintiff establishes a prima facie RFRA claim by proving, with evi-
dentiary support, a substantial burden on a sincere exercise of religion.'24
116. Id.
117. Id. at 959.
118. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 959.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 960.
122. In a concurring opinion, Judge Ebel expressed disagreement with the majority only with
respect to whether Kikumura's allegations, even if supported by evidence, would establish a
"substantial burden" absent a more far-ranging inquiry into matters such as whether the defendants
would grant Kikumura pastoral visits by other Christian ministers whose counseling would be
substantially similar to that by the minister Kikumura requested. See id. at 966. Judge Ebel explained
that, "[b]ecause this is an intrinsically fact-based question, and there has been no opportunity for the
parties to develop these facts, I believe it is inappropriate for us to rule on the issue as a matter of
law at this time .... Since we are remanding anyway for a balancing analysis, I would also remand
to the district court for it to determine whether there is a substantial burden in the first instance,
without prejudging the issue." Id. at 966-67.
123. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 961-62.
124. Id. at 960-61 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a); Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1479
n.l (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that a plaintiffs religious belief must be sincerely held)). But see supra
note 122.
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The court found, and the defendants did not challenge, that Kiku-
mura was sincere in his beliefs.'25 The court also found Kikumura's re-
quest for pastoral visits were "protected activities"'' 26 within the expan-
sive definition of "exercise of religion" Congress adopted in passing the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
("RLUIPA").'27 When the district court considered Kikumura's claim,
RFRA defined "exercise of religion" as "the exercise of religion under
the First Amendment to the Constitution."'2 8 However, Congress had
since amended RFRA to incorporate the RLUIPA definition of "religious
'29exercise" as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc5, 9 which provides that re-
ligious exercise includes "any exercise, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief." Thus, the Tenth Circuit noted
Kikumura's expressed desire to study Christianity and practice Christian
prayer under the tutelage of a clergyman with missionary experience in
Japan satisfied the new RFRA definition of protected "exercise of relig-
ion" even though such pastoral visits were not required by Kikumura's
religious beliefs.'
30
The court, however, found insufficient evidence on record to sup-
port Kikumura's claim that denial of the pastoral visits constituted a
"substantial burden" on his exercise of religion as required for showing a
substantial likelihood of success on his RFRA claim.'3 ' The majority
(with Judge Ebel dissenting on this point only) did conclude, if Kiku-
mura could provide evidentiary support sufficient to prove the allega-
tions related to his "substantial burden" argument, "he will have satisfied
his prima facie burden.' 32 The burden will then shift to the defendants to
prove "application of the burden" to Kikumura is the "least restrictive
means" of furthering a "compelling governmental interest."'1
33
b. First Amendment Free Exercise Claim
In reviving Kikumura's RFRA claim, the Tenth Circuit effectively
breathed new life into RFRA as applied to the federal government within
the Tenth Circuit. The majority (with Judge Holloway dissenting), how-
ever, refused to revive Kikumura's First Amendment claim by agreeing
with the district court that he had not demonstrated a substantial likeli-
125. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 961.
126. Id. at 960-61.
127. See id. at 960; Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc)
(hereinafter, "RLUIPA").
128. Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (1999).
129. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 960; 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-2(4).
130. Kikunura, 242 F.3d at 960-61.
131. Id. at 961.
132. Id. But see supra note 122.
133. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 961-62; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-(1)(b) ("Government may
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person - (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest: and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.")
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hood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claim.' 3 The court
based its decision partly on the deference given prison officials when
evaluating prisoners' constitutional claims'35 and, more significantly,
based on the Supreme Court precedent under Turner v. Safley.
136
Under Turner, a prison regulation may not be "arbitrary or irra-
tional" as evidenced by a valid, rational connection between a legitimate,
government interest and the regulation.37 The court must also consider
whether readily available, alternative means exist for the inmate to exer-
cise the asserted constitutional right, as well as the extent to which ac-
commodating the inmate's right might affect guards, other inmates and
prison resource allocation.'3 8 Here the court found the prison regulation
that allowed pastoral visits only when the prisoner initiates the request
was sufficiently related to the prison's goals of allowing pastoral visits
while limiting the overall number of visits and preventing abuses of the
system. 39 Thus, as a matter of law, the regulation was not "arbitrary or
irrational,"' ° particularly given the deference courts must give prison
regulations that attempt to balance prisoner rights with legitimate pe-
nological concerns. 4 ' Kikumura had to demonstrate that no "obvious,
easy alternatives" to pastoral visitation existed.'4 2 The court ruled that he
failed this test, suggesting that correspondence would be a possible alter-
native to pastoral visitation.'4 3 Accordingly, the majority held the district
court did not commit a legal error or abuse its discretion in concluding
Kikumura failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on his First
Amendment claimi4
c. Dissent
In dissent, Judge Holloway disagreed with the majority's analysis of
Kikumura's First Amendment claim.'4 5 Specifically, Judge Holloway
argued limitations on the number and frequency of pastoral visits would
be an obvious alternative to the "unjustified" use of an inmate's religious
identification to "restrict to that one faith those from whom pastoral vis-
134. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 956. But see infra Part c (summarizing Judge Holloway's dissent).
135. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 956 (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987)
(holding that courts cannot substitute their judgment on matters of institutional administration for
prison officials' determinations, even when First Amendment claims are made)).
136. Id. at 956 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that "when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests")).
137. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 90.
138. Id. at 90-91.
139. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 957.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 957-58 (citing Turner, 482 U.S at 90).
143. Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
144. Id. at 958.
145. Kikurnura, 242 F.3d at 964.
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its or counseling is permitted" and to ban "all other pastoral visitors."'
' 6
For that reason, Judge Holloway found the prison's regulation too broad
and not reasonably related to any legitimate penological interest.14 7 Ac-
cordingly, he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Kikumura
had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on his First
Amendment claim.'4 8 However, he agreed with the majority that, on re-
mand, the district court should provide Kikumura the opportunity to
prove his allegation that the requested clergyman was well suited to pro-
vide him religious assistance.' 9 In agreeing with the majority that Kiku-
mura should be allowed to provide evidentiary support for his RFRA
claim, Judge Holloway stated the defendants also should be allowed to
present any showing they may have on security issues they claim were
involved.5 °
B. The "Indian Tribal Use" Exception Cases
On August 8, 2001, just five months after Kikumura, the Tenth Cir-
cuit simultaneously issued three opinions in cases involving individuals
charged with violating federal laws prohibiting the possession of eagle
feathers - Saenz v. Department of the Interior, United States v. Hard-
man and United States v. Wilgus. 5' In all three cases, the court found the
individuals were practitioners of Native American religions that purport-
edly required the use of items with eagle feathers. 52
The federal laws at issue were the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act ("BEGPA") ' 3 and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA").' 1 Both
acts prohibit, inter alia, the possession and transportation of eagles and
eagle parts unless permitted to do so under the so-called "Indian tribal
use" provisions of the federal "Eagle Permits" regulation.'" The excep-
tion requires applicants to provide the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(the "FWS") with "certification of enrollment in an Indian tribe that is
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 965.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 966.
151. See Saenz v. Dep't of the Interior, No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698 (10th Cir.
Aug. 18, 2001), vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam);
United States v. Hardman, No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. 17702 LEXIS (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001),
vacated by Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199; United States v. Wilgus, No. 00-4015, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
17700 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001) vacated by Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199.
152. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *12; Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. 17702, at *2;
Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *4.
153. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2001).
154. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2001).
155. Id.; 16 U.S.C § 668; 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2002).
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federally recognized"'5 6 and that the applicant be "an Indian who is
authorized to participate in bona fide tribal religious ceremonies."'57
1. Saenz v. Department of the Interior'
a. Facts
The Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians was recognized as a tribe by
the federal government until 1886, when the Chiricahua reservation was
dissolved in the wake of warfare between the Apache and the United
States.5 9 Joseluis Saenz was a descendent of the Chiricahua, whose re-
ligious practices required the use of eagle feathers.'6r In 1996, pursuant to
the BGEPA,16' New Mexico state officials seized and sent to the FWS
eagle feathers from Saenz's home because he did not have a permit
authorizing him to possess them. 162 The BGEPA authorized the Secretary
of the Interior (the "Secretary") to permit the taking, possession and
transportation of eagles and eagle parts under specified circumstances,
including "for the religious practices of Indian tribes.' ' 63 After failing to
get the items back through administrative proceedings, Saenz sought
their return by filing a motion in district court for return of his
property.i64 Saenz argued he had a right to possess eagle feathers under
BGEPA, asserting claims under RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, and the
Equal Protection Clause.6 5 The district court granted Saenz's motion
based "solely on the BGEPA and RFRA" without reaching the constitu-
tional issues.' 66 The government appealed.
b. Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal, the government stipulated Saenz was a Chiricahua In-
dian and sincere practitioner of the Chiricahua Apache Indian religion.67
Even though the government also agreed that the BGEPA substantially
burdened Saenz's religious beliefs, it argued "restricting eagle permits to
members of federally-recognized Indian tribes is the least restrictive
means of furthering the government's compelling interests . . . in eagle
156. The definition of "tribe" and significance of federal recognition is a highly complex and
sensitive issue beyond the scope of this article. See generally COHEN, supra, note 16 at 3-27
(discussing "tribe" and "Indian" as an ethnological classifications and as a legal-political
designations, and the significance of these distinctions in different legal contexts).
157. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22.
158. No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001).
159. Id. at *2.
160. Id.
161. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2001).
162. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *2-3.
163. Id. at *4 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 668a).
164. Id. at *3.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *9.
167. Idat*13.
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conservation and fulfilling its treaty obligations to Indian tribes under
RFRA." '68 The Tenth Circuit, like the court below, analyzed Saenz's re-
quest for return of the eagle feathers under RFRA without specifically
addressing his constitutional claims under the Free Exercise and Equal
Protection clauses. 69 However, in an opinion written by Judge Kelly, the
Tenth Circuit ruled in Saenz's favor and declared the regulation uncon-
stitutional.
70
The court first rejected the government's assertion that Saenz lacked
standing to challenge the permit process because "he failed to actually
apply for a permit.' 7 ' The court reasoned that the regulation restricts
permits to members of federally-recognized Indian tribes and contains no
provision for discretionary waivers.' 72 Therefore, it would have been "fu-
tile" for Saenz to apply for a permit notwithstanding "credible proof that
he is Indian and uses eagle feathers as an essential part of the exercise of
an Indian religion.' 73 "The law recognizes . . . that a plaintiff need not
make costly futile gestures simply to establish standing, particularly
when the First Amendment is implicated.'
' 74
Using the test set forth in Kikumura, the court found Saenz had es-
tablished a prima facie free exercise claim under RFRA by showing the
government had "(1) substantially burdened (2) a sincerely-held (3) re-
ligious belief.' 75 The burden then shifted to the government to "demon-
strate that the challenged regulation furthers a compelling state interest in
the least restrictive manner," as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-Il(b)( 1).176
With respect to the government's asserted interest in fulfilling trust
and treaty obligations, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court
below that trust and treaty obligations generally encompass "a duty to
tribal government and a need to acknowledge tribal sovereignty.' 77
However, it then argued, the central issue in this case was "the rights of
an individual, not as against tribal governments, but as against the United
168. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *12-13.
169. Id. at *13.
170. J. McKay and J. Murphy also sat on this panel.
171. Id. at *14. But see United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
defendant Indians' failure to apply for a permit precluded their challenge to the manner in which the
BGEPA was applied, but preserving their facial challenge of the statute and the "Indian tribal use"
exception under RFRA). Hugs is discussed more fully infra Part H.C.
172. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *15.
173. Id.
174. Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Mich. Gaming Control
Bd., 172 F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 1999).
175. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *15 (citing Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950,
960 (10th Cir. 2001).
176. Id. at *16.
177. Id. at *21-22.
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States.'7' The court also looked to legislative history as an indication
that Congress intended to balance the "conservation purposes of the stat-
ute" against the "special cultural and religious interests of Indians.'
' 79
Thus, the government failed to prove a compelling interest in fulfilling
trust and treaty obligations with respect to the BGEPA.
0
Significantly, the Tenth Circuit questioned the district court's find-
ing that the government had a compelling interest in eagle
conservation. 8 ' However, the court declined to decide on this issue as
"unnecessary" to its disposition of this case, because of its conclusion the
government was not furthering its interest - even if it were compelling -
by the "least restrictive means," pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
1 (b)(2).'
82
The government argued restricting permits to members of federally-
recognized Indian tribes satisfied the "least restrictive means" test for
four reasons."'
The first reason was "allowing all persons of Indian heritage to pos-
sess eagle feathers, without regard to membership in a recognized tribe,
would undermine the United States's obligations to recognized tribes."'
Because the court had already ruled the government failed to prove its
treaty interests in the context of this case were compelling, this reason
could not be used to justify the permit system.'
The government's second argument was that its interest in protect-
ing eagles would be harmed because "significantly increasing the num-
ber of persons authorized by law to possess eagle parts and feathers...
178. Id. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit specifically declined to follow the Eleventh Circuit,
which had held that the government had a compelling interest in fulfilling its treaty obligations based
on an analysis that the BGEPA was "meant to be a substitute for tribes' abrogated hunting treaty
rights." Id. at *19 (citing Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000)). Although the
Supreme Court has held the BGEPA abrogated Native American hunting rights, the purpose of the
"Indian tribes" exception was for "religious" not "hunting" purposes in consideration of the Indians'
"special cultural and religious interests." See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 743-45 (1986).
179. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *20-21.
180. Id. at *22.
181. Id. at *22-23. Though the court acknowledged case law "seems to support this
proposition," it contended the government's "alleged" interest in eagle conservation "existed without
evidentiary analysis," noting the golden eagle was not endangered and the FWS had proposed the
bald eagle be removed from the endangered species list. Id. at *22-23, *23 n.8 (citing Gibson v.
-, Babbitt, 72 F. Supp. 2d. 1356, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 1999), affid, 223 F.3d 1256 (11 th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237,
1241 (D. Ore. 1996); United States v. Thirty Eight (38) Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts, 649 F. Supp.
269, 276-77 (D. Nev. 1986), affd, 829 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1987)). See also Rupert v. United States
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 35 (lst Cir. 1992) (finding the government has a "legitimate
governmental interest" in "protecting a dwindling and precious eagle population").
182. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *23.
183. Id. at *25, *31.
184. Id. at *25.
185. Id. at *26.
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would likely lead to increased numbers of illegal kills and increased reli-
ance on a black market for eagle parts.' 86 The court shot down this ar-
gument for lack of proof that illegal killings would increase or that a
black market for eagle parts even existed.8 7 Arguably, the court stated,
"opening up the permit process to all Native Americans... would de-
crease the number of illegal eagle kills and black market transactions...
[because] a Native American who is not a member of a federally-
recognized tribe has no method . . . of obtaining eagles for religious
ceremonies other than through the black market.',
88
The government also asserted equal protection concerns.' 9 Specifi-
cally, opening up the permit process to all Native Americans would rely
on an "impermissible racial classification."' The government based its
argument on the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Morton v. Man-
car'9' that found membership in a federally-recognized tribe was "politi-
cal in nature rather than racial in nature.' 92 The Saenz court distin-
guished the context for the Morton ruling as "solely concerned with
tribal sovereignty" from Saenz's case as "dealing with an individual's
free exercise rights."' 93 The court went on to note that even the govern-
ment admitted "there may be occasions when it is defensible for the gov-
eminent to rely on ancestry in determining a person's status as an In-
dian."'' 94 In concluding "this is one of those occasions," the court pointed
to certain federal educational and employment programs as examples
that allow for a broader definition of "Indian" that includes Native
Americans who are not members of federally-recognized tribes.'95 The
court also noted "federal policy toward recognition of Indian tribes has
been by no means consistent with 'real' ethnological principles."' 6 Con-
gress has frequently consolidated distinct tribes for recognition purposes,
divided tribes into more than one separately recognized group, termi-
nated some tribes' federal recognition (e.g., the Chiricahua Indians) and
186. Id. at *25.
187. Id. at *29.
188. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *31. By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit, in
upholding the validity of the "Indian tribal use" exception, emphasized that opening up the permit
process would increase the burden on the religious practices of members of federally recognized
tribes. See Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11 th Cir. 2000); discussion infra Part III, C.
189. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *31.
190. Id. at *32.
191. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
192. Id. (citing Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24 (holding that a BIA employment preference
applies to applicants who are members of federally recognized tribes, not as a discrete racial group,
but as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities)). See also COHEN, supra note 16, at 3-27.
193. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *32-33.
194. Id. at *33.
195. Id. at *33-34.
196. Id. at *35-36 (quoting Christopher A. Ford, Executive Prerogatives in Federal Indian
Jurisprudence: The Constitutional Law of Tribal Recognition, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 141, 156
(1995)).
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restored federal recognition for others.' 97 On the one hand, the govern-
ment made federal recognition impossible for the Chiricahua tribe, while
on the other hand, it "wants to use that same lack of recognition to in-
fringe upon Mr. Saenz's religious freedom. We refuse to base Mr.
Saenz's free exercise rights on such tenuous ground."' 98
The court was especially unsympathetic to the government's final
argument that expanding the permit program to encompass all Indians
would make it "administratively unfeasible." '99 The court noted, the
BGEPA permit system exception had operated for at least eleven years
after the Secretary first issued the "Indian tribal use" exception and pos-
sibly for as many as eighteen before the government imposed the "feder-
ally-recognized" requirement.2°° The court, again, pointed to other federal
programs for Native Americans that do not require participants belong to
federally recognized tribes as additional evidence that the government is
able to allocate limited resources among a broader pool of applicants. 20'
The court's bottom line was membership in a federally-recognized
tribe "bears no relationship whatsoever to whether or not an individual
practitioner is of Indian heritage by birth, sincerely holds and practices
traditional Indian religious beliefs, is dependent on eagle feathers for the
expression of those beliefs, and is substantially burdened when prohib-
ited from possessing eagle parts. 2 2
2. United States v. Hardman
20 3
a. Facts
Raymond Hardman had practiced a Native American religion for
many years. 2°4 He lived in Neola, Utah, within the boundaries of the
Uintah and Ouray Ute Reservation.205 Although his ex-wife and children
were enrolled members of the federally recognized S'Kallum Tribe,
Hardman himself was not of Native American descent. 26 In 1993, in the
course of a religious ritual, a Hopi tribal religious leader gave Hardman a
bundle of prayer feathers, including golden eagle feathers, to keep in his
truck which he had used to transport the body of his son's godfather to
religious services in Arizona. 27 After Hardman returned to his home, he
197. Id. at *35-36.
198. Id. at *37.
199. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *37-38.
200. Id. at *5 n.2, *38.
201. Id. at *38.
202. Id. at *38-39.
203. No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001).
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"contacted the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources in order to obtain a
permit to possess the feathers," but was told he could not apply because
he was not a member of a federally recognized tribe.208
In 1996, Hardman's estranged wife told Ute tribal officials Hard-
man possessed golden eagle feathers without a permit.2°9 Subsequently,
Hardman surrendered the feathers, under protest, to a Ute tribal fish and
game officer, who was cross-commissioned as a federal law enforcement
agent.20 On March 10, 1997, Hardman was issued a violation notice for
possessing golden eagle feathers without a permit pursuant to the Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA").21' Almost two years later, a magis-
trate judge convicted Hardman of violating the MBTA and imposed a
small fine.2 2 A district court affirmed Hardman's conviction, and he ap-
pealed to the Tenth Circuit.
21
3
b. Tenth Circuit Opinion
As in Saenz,1 4 the government argued Hardman had no standing
because he never actually applied for a permit. 25" However, the Tenth
Circuit held Hardman's "good faith effort to do so" was sufficient to
establish standing.1 6
Once again, as in Saenz, the tougher question was what standard to
apply to the regulatory requirement that permits could only be issued to
members of federally recognized tribes. 217 Hardman raised Free Exercise
Clause and Establishment Clause challenges to the permit criteria in the
MBTA and its implementing regulation which states: "(1) that the person
be an actual practitioner of a bona fide Native American religion requir-
ing the use of migratory bird feathers, and (2) that the person be a mem-
ber of a certain political classification, i.e., a member of a federally rec-
ognized tribe.",28' Hardman argued both qualifications should be subject
to and would fail strict scrutiny.29
i. Free Exercise Claim: Revisiting RFRA and Smith
208. Id.
209. Id. at *2-3.
210. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *3.
211. Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2001).
212. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *3.
213. Id.
214. 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698 (10th Cir. Aug. 18,2001).
215. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *4.
216. Id.
217. Id. at *6-7; see also Saenz v. Dep't of Interior, no. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
17698 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2001).
218. Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2002)).
219. Id. at *7.
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Judge Tacha, writing for the majority,22° first addressed the question
of whether to apply the RFRA standard of review even though Hardman
had not raised RFRA.22  The court acknowledged that Congress intended
to overturn the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause as set forth in Smith, and also acknowledged that, under its own
decision in Kikumura, RFRA created a "valid statutory 'standard for
suits against the federal government.' ' ,222 The court then concluded "a
RFRA claim for relief from federal burdening of religion is clearly dis-
tinct from a First Amendment claim for identical relief," labeling the
latter a "constitutional free exercise claim" subject to the Smith
standard.223 Although the Tenth Circuit had previously applied the RFRA
standard to a First Amendment claim, "even when it was not raised by
the parties, '224 it declined to do so here.2
In applying the Smith standard, the court posited two questions: (1)
"does a generally applicable law containing an accommodation for a
specific religious group ... violate the Smith requirement of neutrality";
and (2) if "non-neutral, does the fact that the accommodation is for a
Native American religion trump the generic rule, thereby requiring only
the application of a rational basis test, rather than strict scrutiny?,
226
With respect to the first question, the court responded in the af-
firmative. 7 Thus, the court found that, although the MBTA without the
exemption is "clearly neutral ' 228 with the secular purpose of protecting
eagles, "its attendant regulations for practitioners of Native American
religions" rendered it in violation of the Smith neutrality standard.229
However, the court stated its holding was not "dispositive of the neutral-
ity analysis in this case..." because Harding's religion did not prevent
him from complying with the permitting regulations. 230 Rather, his non-
membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe, a "political classifica-
tion render[ed] him . . . in violation of the statute. "23' Because the court
had "no difficulty" finding neutrality forbids "religious accommodations
contingent on membership in a particular political subdivision," it held
220. Also on this panel were J. Henry, concurring, and J. McKay, dissenting. Id. at *2.
221. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *7.
222. Id. at *8-9 (emphasis added) (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) and
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (2001), and mentioning City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997)).
223. Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
224. Id. at *10 (citing Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995)).
225. Id. (refusing to "transform [Hardman's] constitutional claim into a statutory one").
226. Id. at *12.
227. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *12.
228. Id. at *13 n.3.
229. Id. at *35-36.
230. Id. at *36.
231. Id.
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both qualifying requirements of the permitting process violated Smith's
neutrality prong.232
With respect to the second question, the Tenth Circuit responded in
the negative.233 The court specifically rejected the rationale adopted by
the First Circuit in upholding the same regulation pursuant to an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge.] In Rupert v. Director, United States Fish &
Wildlife Service,233 the First Circuit held that "where the government has
treated Native Americans differently from others in a manner that argua-
bly creates a religious classification," the First Amendment is not vio-
lated because of "Congress's historical obligation to respect Native
American sovereignty and to protect Native American culture.2 3 6 The
Tenth Circuit found the First Circuit's analysis inapplicable to Hard-
man's free exercise claim, because the First Amendment's "two religion
clauses protect different values, and because they require different things
from the government.3 37 Rupert concerned the government's inability to
"maintain strict non-entanglement with religion when it was exercising
its trust duties toward Native American tribes., 238 By contrast, in analyz-
ing Hardman's situation, the Tenth Circuit found the Free Exercise
Clause is concerned with "protecting individual religious freedom" so
that the "Free Exercise Clause cannot be trumped by the guardian-ward
relationship between the government and Native American tribes. 239
Thus, the court concluded First Amendment strict scrutiny applied and
required the regulation be "justified by a compelling governmental inter-
est and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
' 2
40
Contrary to the Saenz panel, this Tenth Circuit panel found that the
United States had compelling interests sufficient to save the regulation.4
The court distinguished the MBTA from the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act ("BGEPA")2 2 in that the former implements treaty
agreements between the United States and Mexico, which the court
found created a compelling governmental interest in "enforcing its treaty
obligations.. .,,14 Although this panel found the government's interest in
protecting Native American culture and religion was inapplicable to the
analysis that lead to its use of the strict scrutiny test, it noted that this
interest - the same interest the Saenz panel found uncompelling - also
232. Id. at *37.
233. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *12.
234. Id. at *40-41.
235. 957 F.2d 32(1st Cir. 1992).
236. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *40 (quoting Rupert, 957 F.2d at 34-35).
237. Id. at *48.
238. Id. at *49.
239. Id.
240. id. at *49-50 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531-32, 546 (1993)).
241. Id. at *55.
242. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2001).
243. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *50-52.
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was sufficiently compelling to justify the burden on Hardman's free ex-
ercise of his religion.2"
ii. Establishment Clause Claim
Because the court had already determined the permitting process
survived strict scrutiny in its free exercise analysis, it concluded it did
not need to decide whether the regulation should be subject to the ra-
tional basis or strict scrutiny review in the Establishment Clause
context.245 However, in dicta, the court noted that, where a denomina-
tional preference exists, strict scrutiny applies,2" but also acknowledged
the "unique guardian-ward relationship between the federal government
and Native American tribes precludes the degree of separation of church
and state ordinarily required by the First Amendment., 247 The court also
stated the government could not apply "conventional separatist under-
standings of the establishment clause" to that relationship.248
c. Dissent
Judge McKay, who also sat on the Saenz panel, dissented.249 He dis-
agreed with the majority's characterization of RFRA "as a statutory
cause of action separate from a constitutional claim.""25 Rather, McKay
wrote that RFRA is a "required statutory supplement to those constitu-
tional claims.""n In this regard, RFRA strict scrutiny applies to all free
exercise challenges to federal government actions even if not raised by
any of the parties.252
Judge McKay acknowledged that the First, Ninth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits had held that the Indian tribal use regulation survived strict scru-
tiny, but declined to follow their precedent. 253 Despite his belief that the
federal government, as a matter of law, has a compelling interest in ac-
commodating Native Americans' religious practices, Judge McKay
wrote, "it is not at all obvious to me that this interest leads to the conclu-
244. Id. at *54-55. Significantly, in light of the holding in Saenz, this panel stated it did not
reach "more specific questions which may arise later under 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 such as whether a
bona fide Native American who is not a member of a federally recognized tribe may constitutionally
be excluded from the exemption." Id. at *55 n.21.
245. Id. at *58.
246. Id. at *56 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)).
247. Id. (quoting Peyote Way Church of God, Inc., v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th
Cir. 1999)).
248. Id.
249. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *63.
250. Id. at *68.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11 th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hugs, 109
F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997); Rupert v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.
1992)).
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sion that the government may draw distinctions between adherents to the
same religion and practices."
Judge McKay's dissent also echoed the Saenz panel in questioning
whether sufficient evidence existed to support the government's claim of
a compelling interest in protecting eagles . 5 He rejected the majority's
finding that the government had a compelling interest in fulfilling its
treaty obligations under the MBTA.256 Though the treaty authorizes the
government to enact regulations for distributing eagle parts, Judge
McKay argued, such regulations "must comply with the Constitution." 7
He concluded that the record was not adequately developed to de-
termine whether the government's interest in protecting eagles was com-
pelling, and if so, whether it was sufficiently compelling to "require dis-
crimination among adherents to the same religion."' 8 Judge McKay
stated additional fact finding on this issue was needed to determine
whether the regulatory scheme satisfied "either the narrowly tailored or
the least restrictive means tests" for achieving any government interest
"so compelling as to justify the denial of free exercise of religion."5 9
3. United States v. Wilgus
260
a. Facts
Samuel Ray Wilgus, Jr., like Hardman, was a non-Indian who was a
"bona fide adherent of a Native American religion.26 Possession of eagle
feathers was central to his beliefs and practices. 262 In June 1998, a Utah
Highway Patrol officer stopped a pick-up truck in which Wilgus was a
passenger and discovered a box containing 137 feathers from bald and
golden eagles.2 63 Wilgus admitted he possessed the feathers and others
subsequently seized from his home by the Utah Division of Wildlife Re-
sources.264 Wilgus was charged with violating the BGEPA because he did
not have a permit.265 He entered a conditional guilty plea, which permit-
ted him to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss
the indictment in which he asserted violations of the First Amendment's
religion clauses.2
254. Id. at *68-69.
255. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *69.
256. Id. at *70.
257. Id.
258. Id. at *71.
259. Id.
260. No. 00-4015, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001).
261. Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *4.
262. Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *3.
263. Id. at *2-3.
264. Id. at *3.
265. Id. at *4.
266. Id. at *5.
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b. Tenth Circuit Opinion
Judge Ebel,267 writing for the majority, raised the threshold issue of
whether RFRA always applies in free exercise cases even when, as here,
it is not raised on appeal.268 After acknowledging the split among the cir-
cuits on this question, the court declined to apply RFRA - notwithstand-
ing a finding that the regulation substantially burdened Wilgus's relig-
ious freedom - based on the rule that "an appellant must raise the issues
upon which he seeks [the] court's review. 2 69 Where Judge McKay's dis-
sent in Hardman found RFRA "by its own language ... applies 'in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened, ' '2 70 the
Wilgus majority argued that "[h]ad Congress desired... courts to apply
RFRA in all free exercise cases ... it would have written RFRA unam-
biguously to achieve that purpose.27'
i. Free Exercise Claim
Like the Hardman majority, the majority in Wilgus applied the
Smith standard, but reached a different conclusion.2 In this instance, the
court relied largely on Church of the Lukumi Babalu, Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, for guidance to determine whether the BGEPA is neutral and
generally applicable.2 7 1 "Neutrality," the court noted, is a "subjective
inquiry into the purpose or object of a law," while "general applicability"
274is an objective inquiry as to its scope.
Because the BGEPA's purpose was protecting eagles, the court held
it was neutral despite its exceptions for Indian religious and other pur-
poses such as scientific exhibitions, which do "not change the
[BGEPA's] purpose., 27" Even if the Indian tribal use exception was ex-
amined separately, the court found the law would not violate the neutral-
ity principle because the object and purpose is to permit members of fed-
erally recognized tribes to use eagle feathers in their worship, not to pro-
hibit non-Indians from doing So.276 The court asserted that a fundamental
difference exists between laws having the purpose to accommodate re-
ligious practices and those that prohibit or burden religion.277 By analogy,
267. Also on this panel were J. McWilliams, concurring, and J. Baldock, dissenting. Id. at *2.
268. Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, *6-7.
269. Id. at *9 (citing Hernandez v. Starbuck, 69 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir. 1995)).
270. United States v. Hardman, No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702 at *67 (10th Cir.
Aug. 8, 2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000bb(b)(1)).
271. Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at * 10-11.
272. Id. at *12-15.
273. Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *12-15 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531, 533 (1993)).
274. Id. at *14.
275. Id. at *15-16 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 668a).
276. Id. at *16.
277. Id. at *16-17. When a generally applicable statute incidentally burdens religion, recent
Supreme Court decisions suggest legislative attempts to relieve such government-imposed burdens
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Judge Ebel explained that if he permits his daughter to drive his car, his
purpose is not to prohibit his son from driving the car "even if that is the
practical effect." 278 Though exceptions made for certain religious groups
may support a conclusion that a "covert purpose of a legislative scheme
is to discriminate. . . 'adverse impact will not always lead to a finding of
impermissible targeting.'
279
Although the Supreme Court had defined a neutral law as one that
neither burdened nor benefited religious conduct, here, the Tenth Circuit
applied a narrower definition that looked only to whether the regulation
at issue burdened religious practice. 280 The court employed a textual
analysis comparing the word "prohibiting" in the Free Exercise Clause
281
with the "more general word 'respecting' in the Establishment Clause .
Thus, in applying the narrower view of neutrality, the court concluded
that the BGEPA is neutral because the purpose of the law's exceptions is
to "benefit members of federally recognized Indian tribes ... and not to
burden anyone., 2s' The court buttressed its conclusion that the BGEPA
was neutral by asserting the Indian tribal use exception was designed to
benefit a political group rather than a racial or religious group, citing
several examples in which federal law has recognized Indians' special
281status as a permissible political classification.
The court also found the BGEPA satisfied the "objective half of the
Smith analysis. '284 The court argued general applicability does not mean
"universal applicability. '215 "Rather, 'general' should be given its cus-
tomary meaning of 'widespread,' 'predominant' or 'prevalent,' ad-
mit[ting] the possibility of some minor exceptions or deviations. 286 Be-
cause the BGEPA's proscription against possessing eagle feathers is a
on free exercise are "permissible accommodations" that do not offend the Establishment Clause. See
Roberto L. Corrada, Religious Accommodation and the National Labor Relations Act, 17 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & L. 185, 191 (1996).
278. Id. at *17.
279. Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *18-19 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 535). Wilgus notes that a city's general prohibition against ritual animal
slaughter constituted "an impermissible attempt to target" a specific church's religious practices). Id.
at *18 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 535).
280. Id. at * 19-22 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 532).
281. id. at *22.
282. Id. at *24.
283. Id. at *25-28. (quoting Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979) ("[Tihe peculiar semi-sovereign and constitutionally
recognized status of Indians justifies special treatment..."); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552
(1974) ("Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes . . . single out for special
treatment a constituency of tribal Indians."); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977)
("[Federal legislation with respect to Indian tribes . . . is not based upon impermissible racial
classifications...").
284. Id. at *28.
285. Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *30.
286. Id.
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prohibition imposed on "almost all of society," the court found it fits
squarely within its definition of generally applicable.287
By applying the Smith standard to find the BGEPA both neutral and
generally applicable rather than RFRA's more rigorous compelling inter-
est test, the court avoided the necessity of evaluating the strength of the
government's interests. The court also dismissed what it referred to as
the "'Sherbert exception,"' arguing that its mandate to apply strict scru-
tiny to individual exemptions in the post-Smith era applies only to unem-
ployment compensation cases.288 Thus, the BGEPA "falls within the
Smith safe harbor" and does not offend the Free Exercise Clause, "de-
spite its incidental effect on Wilgus's religious practice."'289
ii. Establishment Clause Claim
Wilgus also argued the BGEPA violated the Establishment Clause
by creating "impermissible denominational and racial preferences" by
permitting members of federally recognized Indian tribes to possess ea-
gle feathers but denying him that privilege. 290 The court, again, looked to
precedent recognizing the unique relationship between the federal gov-
ernment and Indian tribes. It determined that the government need only
show that the special treatment the BGEPA bestows on Native Ameri-
cans is "rationally related to the government's extraordinary duty to Indi-
ans." 29' Here, in contrast to Saenz, the court concluded that the "Indian
tribal use" exception to the BGEPA was "rationally related to the gov-




In his dissenting opinion, Judge Baldock disagreed with the major-
ity's application of Smith.293 He argued that the majority unjustifiably
ignored RFRA's "heightened legislative standard," against which Con-
gress "undoubtedly intended courts to measure laws such as the
BGEPA.''294 Like Judge McKay in his Hardman dissent, Judge Baldock
found "RFRA's plain language and tone" unambiguous in its intent that
RFRA applies "'in all cases where free exercise of religion is substan-
287. Id. at *31.
288. Id. at *31 n.16 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)).
289. Id. at *32.
290. Id. at *32.
291. Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *33-34 (citing Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979) (explaining the Court
"has repeatedly held that the peculiar semisovereign and constitutionally recognized status of Indians
justifies special treatment on their behalf when rationally related to the Government's 'unique
obligation toward the Indians"').
292. Id at *34.
293. Id.
294. Id. at *35.
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tially burdened.' 29" Because the BGEPA's substantial burden on Wil-
gus's exercise of his religious beliefs was undisputed, RFRA should ap-
ply .
296
With respect to the majority's argument that the court need not ap-
ply RFRA because Wilgus failed to raise it as an affirmative defense,
Judge Baldock argued that the district court's error in concluding that the
United States Supreme Court had held RFRA unconstitutional was
among the "exceptional circumstances" in which an appellate court could
and should raise the issue to correct the defect - particularly in a criminal
case in which the defendant's substantial rights are affected.297 In fact,
Judge Baldock suggested that Wilgus might have thought he was pre-
cluded from asserting his RFRA claim on appeal based on the district
298court's erroneous conclusion that RFRA was unconstitutional.
Judge Baldock stopped short of concluding the BGEPA failed to
meet constitutional muster under RFRA. Rather, he argued more facts
were needed to determine, for example, the effect of the recent reclassifi-
cation of bald eagles from endangered to threatened and the number of
non-Indians who practice Native American religions that require eagle
feathers.299
Judge Baldock also stated that the majority's discussion of Wilgus's
Establishment Clause claim was unnecessary and premature. 3°° He rea-
soned that if the BGEPA survived RFRA's strict scrutiny, "it will pass
any level of scrutiny applicable to Establishment Clause challenges. 30 '
Alternatively, if the BGEPA failed strict scrutiny, Wilgus's conviction
would fall and his Establishment Clause challenge would be moot.
30 2
C. Analysis
Two other circuits have ruled that the Indian tribal use exception
withstands strict scrutiny review under RFRA, even when challenged by
ethnologically Indian practitioners of religious ceremonies that require
the use of eagle feathers.3 3
295. Id. at *38 (citing 42 U.S.C. 2000bb(b)(1)); see also Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
17702, at *61.
296. See id. at *38.
297. Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *39-40.
298. See id. at *40 n.4.
299. Id. at *41.
300. Id. at *42 n.5.
301. Id.
302. Id. at *42 n.5.
303. See Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v.
Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). In Hugs, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the
challenged regulation under RFRA, even though City. of Boerne was then pending before the
Supreme Court. Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1378 n. 1. The court reasoned that because it found the regulation
survived strict scrutiny under RFRA, it would also survive a less stringent test if the court
invalidated RFRA. Id.
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In United States v. Hugs, the Ninth Circuit held the BGEPA and
permit system "provide the least restrictive means of conserving eagles
while permitting access to eagles and eagle parts for religious
purposes."3°4 In this case, two Native Americans were convicted of tak-
ing, attempting to take and purchasing eagles without a permit in viola-
tion of the BGEPA as a result of an undercover operation conducted by a
state game warden on the Crow Reservation. 35 Though the defendants
admitted they trapped, shot at and killed eagles, they claimed they did so
to obtain eagle feathers and parts for religious use and that the BEGPA
infringed on their free exercise of religion.3° The court was not asked to
evaluate the government's interest in protecting eagles, because the de-
fendants stipulated the interest was compelling. 30 7 However, the court
found the BGEPA's legislative history reflected "the importance of pro-
tecting eagles because of their religious significance to Native Ameri-
cans. '" 3 8 It specifically rejected the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico's holding that the BGEPA was unconstitutional
because the government had failed to establish a compelling interest in
eagle conservation, since the golden eagle was not endangered and "the
permit system was 'utterly offensive and ultimately ineffectual. ' ' 3°9 The
court then determined the information required to obtain a permit was
"the minimum necessary to assure that eagles and eagle parts will be
used for religious purposes," and, therefore, satisfied RFRA's least re-
strictive means requirement.30 In Hugs, the Ninth Circuit was asked to
invalidate the permit system as facially unconstitutional without regard
to the distinction between Indians who are members of federally recog-
nized tribes and those who are not.
In Gibson v. Babbitt, 31 however, this distinction was central to
Eleventh Circuit's analysis. Here, a Native American challenged the ea-
gle feather permitting system under the First Amendment and RFRA
after the FWS denied his request for a permit because he was not en-
rolled in a federally recognized tribe. 13 In a per curiam decision, the Gib-
son court first analyzed the BGEPA under RFRA and found the govern-
304. Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1378.
305. Id. at 1377.
306. Id.
307. See id.
308. Id; see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740-44 (1986) (discussing the legislative
history of the BGEPA and the exception for Indian religious use of eagle feathers and eagle parts).
309. Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1379 (citing United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1307 (D.N.M.
1986)).
310. Id. at 1378.
311. See id. at 1379; see also De Meo, supra note 16, at 796-97; Perkins, supra note 16, at 703
(arguing the permitting system is unconstitutional because it is an unduly burdensome infringement
on Indian religious practices).
312. 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (l ith Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (explaining that the issue on appeal
narrows to permit applicants who are members of federally recognized Indian tribes).
313. Gibson, 223 F.3d at 1257.
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ment had a compelling interest in "fulfilling its treaty obligations with
federally recognized Indian tribes. 314 In so doing, the court declined to
address the government's other asserted interests in protecting eagles and
preserving Native American religions."5 The court found the demand for
eagle parts by members of federally recognized tribes exceeded the sup-
ply.1 6 Therefore, extending permits to other Indians would increase the
already prolonged delays "in providing eagle parts to members of feder-
ally recognized Indian tribes, thereby vitiating the government's efforts
to fulfill its treaty obligations."3 '7 The court then concluded the permit-
ting system was the least restrictive means to achieve the government's
compelling interest in fulfilling its obligations to federally recognized
tribes.3 By the same test, the court also determined the regulation did
not violate the First Amendment.3 9
Notwithstanding the factual differences among the Ninth, Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits' challenges to the Indian tribal use exception to the
BGEPA and the MBTA, these cases represent the collision of several
important issues that surely will remain controversial regardless of how
the Tenth Circuit rules on rehearing.
Even if one agrees with the commentators and jurisdictions that
have construed City of Boerne as invalidating RFRA as applied to federal
actions,3 20 the critical issue is whether the regulation should be analyzed
as "legislation that singles out Indians for particular and special treat-
ment"32 under Morton or as a Free Exercise challenge under Smith. 322 If
viewed as favoring benefits for members of federally registered tribes,
Morton suggests the Indian tribal use exception would be constitutional
as long as the court finds "the preference is reasonable and rationally
designed to further Indian self-government. 323
Under Smith, however, the starting point is determining whether the
requirement is neutral and generally applicable' 2 - a point on which the
Tenth Circuit was split in its initial decisions in Hardman and Wilgus.
32
1
If the court finds the Indian tribal use exception is not neutral and gener-




318. Gibson, 223 F.3d. at 1258.
319. Id. at 1258-59.
320. See Hamilton, supra note 20; Blatnik, supra note 21; Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475,
481 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 678 (2001).
321. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974).
322. See Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
323. Morton, 417 U.S. at 555.
324. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-81.
325. See United States v. Hardman, No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702 (10th Cir.
Aug. 8, 2001), vacated by 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); United States v. Wilgus, No.
00-4015, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001), vacated by United States v.
Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
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ally applicable, as did the Hardman majority, it must subject the regula-
tion to strict scrutiny."6 The regulation might survive heightened scrutiny
if viewed as a burden the non-Indian majority has imposed on itself to
relieve the burden the BGEPA and MBTA would otherwise impose on a
political minority's religious freedom. Alternatively, the regulation
would be less likely to pass constitutional muster if found to favor one
individual's religious practice over another.
If the regulation is subject to strict scrutiny under Smith or RFRA,
the question becomes whether the court will find any of the govern-
ment's asserted interests sufficiently compelling to satisfy the first prong
of the test. From a civil liberties perspective, these cases may turn on
whether the government's interest is characterized as protecting the
unique status of federally recognized Indian tribes as a political classifi-
cation, protecting individual's religious practice without regard to de-
nomination, protecting a religious minority or, as in the Hardman case,
fulfilling the United States' treaty obligations to Mexico under the
MBTA.327
If the court extends permit eligibility to all Indians, it must also
overcome an equal protection argument that would create a constitution-
ally suspect class based on race. If the court extends permit eligibility to
all individuals who engage in Indian religious practices, it could en-
counter Establishment Clause problems.32 Furthermore, any expansion of
the permitting system might also provide additional fodder for those who
argue eagle conservation is less than compelling.329
326. See Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *36.
327. See Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *54-55. In this regard, future claims may
turn on whether the government is seeking to enforce the MBTA, which implicates international
treaty obligations, or the BGEPA, which does not. See also United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d
1199, 1200 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Are there any relevant differences between the MBTA and the
BGEPA such that we should analyze their effect on religious exercise separately?").
328. But see Corrada, supra note 277, at 252-81. Corrada asserts that under the "burden lifting"
model advanced by Justice Scalia, most accommodations of religion would be constitutionally valid.
Id. at 265. The ultimate test of a legislative accommodation under this model, which Corrada views
as being consistent with Smith, would be whether the exemption "alleviate[s] a government-imposed
burden on religion." Id. Thus, an argument can be made that the Establishment Clause is not a
constitutional obstacle to extending eligibility for permits to all practitioners of Indian religions (or
even any religion that might require the use of eagle parts) to the extent that the BGEPA and MBTA
are viewed as laws by which the government has burdened such practitioners' religion and the
permitting system is characterized as an accommodation to lift that burden. At the same time,
Corrada describes other accommodation models that are less tolerant of religious accommodations.
Id. In particular, strict application of the three-pronged test first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman
"would serve to invalidate virtually any statutory religious exemption from generally applicable
laws." Id. at 253, 272 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) declaring a government
accommodation of religious freedom violates the Establishment Clause unless it (1) serves a "secular
legislative purpose;" (2) has a "principal or primary effect ... that neither advances nor inhibits
religion;" and (3) does not foster an "excessive government entanglement" with religion.).
329. Environmental organizations were notably absent from the list of amici who submitted
briefs when the Tenth Circuit considered this issue on January 15, 2002. See supra note 15.
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III. CONCLUSION
In Kikumura, the court unequivocally established that RFRA lives
in the Tenth Circuit for federal claims, a fact acknowledged in the three
subsequent cases.33° However, RFRA's vitality remained questionable.
Implicit in Kikumura is the notion that RFRA could sustain a plaintiff's
asserted free exercise claim as a statutory matter, even if the challenged
federal law or regulation satisfied rational basis review under the Smith
First Amendment test.
33'
Kikumura, however, did not reach the issue of whether RFRA was
strong enough to carry a religious freedom claim when it was not specifi-
cally asserted or when it bumps up against an Establishment Clause
claim.332 These questions and others did surface in the three Indian tribal
use exception cases in which opinions were issued, vacated and ordered
for rehearing en banc as directed by United States v. Hardman.333
Clearly cognizant of the conflicts among the jurists over fundamen-
tal questions of law, the court set forth more than twenty questions for
rehearing. 3' The first is whether RFRA or the less onerous First
Amendment standard set forth in Smith applies to Free Exercise Clause
cases.333 Specifically, should claims arising from burdens on religious
freedom be subject to RFRA's statutory strict scrutiny analysis, as urged
by Judges McKay and Baldock, in lieu of the courts' traditional First
Amendment analysis, even when parties have not raised RFRA below or
on appeal? 336 Additionally, what difference, if any, exists between
RFRA's least restrictive means requirement and the First Amendment
analysis' narrow tailoring requirement for laws that are not neutral and/or
generally applicable? A related issue is the precedent of Werner, in
which the Tenth Circuit applied the RFRA despite its absence in the
pleadings, after City of Boerne.337
The remaining enumerated issues specifically focused on the appli-
cable standard for a Free Exercise Clause analysis of the MBTA and
BGEPA, but may provide clues as to how the Tenth Circuit might ana-
lyze other cases implicating the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses.338 Do the BGEPA and MBTA fall within Smith's "safe harbor"
330. See generally Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001).
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
334. Hardman, 260 F.3d at 1200-02.
335. Id. at 1200.
336. Id.
337. See id.; Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995).
338. See Hardman, 260 F.3d at 1200. This article approaches the serendipitous occurrence of
three factually similar, though not identical, situations as a potential opportunity for the court to
illuminate and advance the understanding of the interplay between the Establishment and Free
Exercise clauses in a way that might have utility beyond its application to the Indian tribal use
exception to the BGEPA and MBTA. See United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001).
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as laws that are neutral and generally applicable? 339 If so, should the court
extend to free exercise cases the rational relationship standard other cir-
cuits have applied in the Establishment Clause context when analyzing
laws based on the unique relationship between the federal government
and Indian tribes? 340 If the Acts are not neutral, not generally applicable
nor establish "a system of individualized exemptions," will they survive
strict scrutiny?M ' What level and type of scrutiny should the court give to
Establishment Clause challenges - rational basis, strict scrutiny, the
Lemon v. Kurtzman test, or one of its modern variants?
32
Kathryn S. Kanda
At the same time, the difficulties the Tenth Circuit encountered which led to inconsistent results
from the first hearings could indicate such expectations are unrealistic. See generally William P.
Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions: The Example of the
Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 243 (1989) (supporting his thesis that "the search for a
comprehensive theory of unconstitutional conditions is ultimately futile" by noting the "baselines"
against which the constitutionality of religious benefits and deprivations may be measured "may not
even remain constant within one constitutional protection").
339. Id.
340. Id.; see Rupert v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992); Peyote
Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying the rational basis
test to Establishment Clause cases).
341. Hardman, 260 F.3d at 1200; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993) (requiring application of First Amendment strict scrutiny to
non-neutral laws that are not generally applicable); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)
(requiring the government to demonstrate a compelling interest to support laws that create systems
of individualized exemptions); cf Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-85 (1990) (holding
the Sherbert test inapplicable to free exercise challenges of governmental actions that substantially
burden a religious practice).
342. Hardman, 260 F.3d at 1200-01; see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); see also
Rupert v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992); Peyote Way Church of
God v. Thomburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying rational basis scrutiny to Establishment
Clause cases); cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (analyzing "whether the
government entanglement with religion is excessive"); Corrada, supra note 277.
